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Joint Accounts, Setoff, and Distribution of
Marital Property in North Carolina
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal labyrinth of divorce can challenge even the most
adroit lawyer.' Depending upon the property interests and ami-
cability of the couple involved, divorce proceedings can be col-
ored by a variety of emotions and difficulties.2 Not surprisingly,
the North Carolina legislature has attempted to remove at least
one common stumbling-block in obtaining a divorce: the distri-
bution of marital property.3 The legislature addressed the prob-
lem of property division by creating a system in which marital
property is distributed on an equitable basis.4 However, some
issues relating to the division of property are not addressed by
the express language of the statute. One such situation involves
1. See generally LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA DIVORCE, ALIMONY, AND
CHILD CUSTODY (1995) (describing state-specific procedures followed to obtain a
divorce).
2. See id.
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1999). This statute is referred to as the Marital
Property Distribution Act, and it sets forth the approved method for determining,
evaluating, and distributing marital property. See id. "Upon application of a party,
the court shall determine what is the marital property and shall provide for an eq-
uitable distribution of the marital property between the parties in accordance with
the provisions of this section." See id. at N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-20(2). The passage of
an equitable distribution act reflects the view that marriage is "a partnership, a
shared enterprise to which both spouses make valuable contributions, albeit in dif-
ferent ways." Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina:
A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REv. 247 (1983). For comment on whether this
notion of partnership is better reflected in divorce than in marriage, see K. Edward
Greene, A Spouse's Right to Control Assets During Marriage: Is North Carolina Living in
the Dark Ages? 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 203, 211 (1996).
4. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Step By Step: The Development of the Distributive Con-
sequences of Divorce in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2017, 2022-2023 (1998); Sally
Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North
Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 198-201 (1987) [hereinafter The Partnership Ideal]; Sally
supra note 3, at 250-251.
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marital joint accounts and a bank' s right of setoff.5
Suppose that Wendy and Harold, who are married, have a
joint account at First Local Bank.6 Harold takes out a loan, inde-
pendent of Wendy, to finance the hardware store that he inher-
ited from his father. Unfortunately, Harold' s Hardware does not
flourish, and Harold defaults on the loan. First Local would like
to use Harold and Wendy' s joint account to set off some of the
debt owed on the loan. The initial problem here seems to be one
of setoff of a single party' s debt against a joint account.
A personal situation complicates the problem. Harold and
Wendy are determined to obtain a divorce, and they are prepar-
ing to distribute their property pursuant to North Carolina's
Marital Property Distribution Act.7 Under North Carolina law,
how will the debt incurred by Harold be allocated among the
parties, and how will that allocation affect the treatment of the
joint account? Essentially, will both parties share Harold' s debt
to the bank, or will Harold be entirely responsible?
The case of Harold and Wendy illustrates a number of
complexities and unanswered questions at work in the North
Carolina case and statutory law. First, the correct interpretation
of setoff in the context of joint accounts is unclear: one can piece
together a position using older cases, but there is no definitive
recent treatment of the law in the area.8 Second, the bank' s spe-
cific rights and remedies in a case similar to that of Harold and
Wendy are unclear under North Carolina's current laws.9 The
5. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (defining setoff and joint ac-
counts).
6. Savings banks are the focus of this article. Primary attention in the area of
setoff is thus given to N.C. GEM. STAT. § 54C-169, the statute which deals with setoff
on joint accounts and savings banks. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54C-169 (1999). However,
joint accounts are possible in other banking contexts, such as credit unions and sav-
ings and loan associations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 541-129 (1999) (discusses joint
accounts held at savings and loan associations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.58 (1999)
(discusses joint accounts in the context of credit unions). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
54B-131 (1999) (specifically discussing the right of setoff in context of savings and
loan associations).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1999).
8. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text (discussing setoff and joint ac-
counts in North Carolina).
9. See id.
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purpose of this Note is to focus attention on the relationship that
might arise between setoff, joint accounts, and marital property
in the context of divorce and to offer a remedy for the problems
created therein.
First, this Note will briefly examine the concepts of setoff
and joint accounts, using both general definitions and specific
examples from North Carolina statutes.10 Next, the Note will ex-
plore North Carolina's Marital Property Distribution Act." Re-
turning to the situation of Harold and Wendy, the Note will
compare and contrast some recent case law from other states
with North Carolina law.12 After discussing some proposed solu-
tions offered by two researchers who have studied joint accounts
and setoff,' 3 this Note will examine the elements that are lacking
in North Carolina' s law of setoff and offer some solutions to
remedy those gaps. 14
II. DEFINING THE RELEVANT TERMS: WHAT Is SETOFF, AND WHAT
DIFFERENCE DoEs IT MAKE IN A JOINT AccouNT ?
Setoff can be thought of as the cancellation of cross de-
mands, that is, the satisfaction of all or part of a debt owed by X
to Y through the simultaneous discharge or forgiveness of a debt
due to X from y.15 Banks are allowed the right of setoff in North
Carolina because the relationship created between the bank and
the account holder is viewed as one of debtor and creditor. 6
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text (discussing marital property
distribution in North Carolina).
12. See infra notes 60-106 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting
North Carolina law with that of other states).
13. See infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text (discusses two proposed so-
lutions offered for setoff problems).
14. See infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
15. Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems With Setoff. A Proposed Legislative Solu-
tion, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 51 (1988).
16. See Rosenstein v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank, 304 N.C. 541, 543, 283
S.E.2d 504, 506 (1981); Schwabenton v. Security Nat'l. Bank of Greensboro, 251 N.C.
655, 656, 11 S.E.2d 856, 857 (1960). For example, a depositor in a bank is entitled to
retrieve the money in her account upon demand. Mutuality of obligation may arise
in a situation where the depositor borrows funds from the bank. In such a situation,
2000]
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Joint accounts may be created under North Carolina law
when an account is established by two or more people using a
written contract.17 Joint accounts can be divided into three types:
(1) joint accounts, which require the signature of each holder to
validate account transactions; (2) joint accounts, which require
the signature of only one holder to validate transactions; and (3)
payable-upon-death joint accounts, which effectively transfer the
right to the account to a specified party upon the death of an-
other party who previously kept sole control of the account. 18 In
North Carolina, there is a rebuttable presumption that half of
such an account belongs to each person.' 9 In addition, the right
of setoff on deposit accounts is controlled by statute in North
Carolina.20
each party is obligated to the other for some amount. In case the borrowed funds
are not repaid, the bank would then have the right to satisfy the loan obligation
using the funds in the depositor's account. See Schwabenton, 251 N.C. at 656, 11
S.E.2d at 857. The right of banks to setoff in North Carolina was established in the
1930s. See Stelling v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 213 N.C. 324, 327, 197 S.E. 754,
755 (1938); Munday v. Bank of Franklin, 211 N.C. 276, 278, 189 S.E. 779, 779 (1937);
Town of Lumberton v. Hood, 204 N.C. 171,174, 167 S.E. 641, 643 (1933). Setoff as a
right for deposit institutions was most recently affirmed in 1989 by the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals. See Killette v. Raemell Sewing Apparel, Inc., 93 N.C. App.
162, 163, 377 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1989).
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146.1(a) (1999). "Any two or more persons may
establish a deposit account or accounts by written contract. The deposit account
and any balance thereof shall be held for them as joint tenants, with or without
right of survivorship, as the contract shall provide." Id. See also McAuliffe v.
Wilson, 41 N.C. App. 117, 119-120, 254 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1979) (stating that
creations of joint interest are well established in North Carolina law).
18. Paul Laurino, Note, Whose Money Is It Anyway? A Bank's Right to Setoff
Against Joint Accounts, 1996 COLum. Bus. L. REv. 61, 63.
19. See McAuliffe, 41 N.C. App. at 120, 254 S.E.2d at 549 (holding that defen-
dant wrongfully withdrew funds from joint account after becoming apprehensive
about future of cohabitant relationship.) It is also the rule in this jurisdiction that,
nothing else appearing, money in the bank to the joint credit of two persons is pre-
sumed to belong one half to each person. However, where a controversy arises as to
ownership, the intent of the parties will be controlling, and evidence may be re-
ceived to prove such intent. Id. One should be careful not to assume that cohabi-
tants enjoy the same protection as married couples under the equitable distribution
statute. See McIver v. McIver, 92 N.C. App. 116, 125, 374 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1988).
"Only married persons are afforded the protections of our equitable distribution
statute. That statute is unambiguous: property must be acquired during marriage to
be classified as marital property, and only marital property is subject to distribu-
tion." Id.
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54C-169 (1999).
A savings bank shall have a right of setoff, without further agree-
ment or pledge, upon all deposit accounts owned by any member
[Vol. 4
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As a rule, four conditions must exist in order for setoff to
take place: (1) the funds to be set off must be property of the
debtor; (2) the funds must be deposited without restrictions; (3)
the existing indebtedness must be due and owing; and 4) there
must exist mutuality of obligation.21 These four requirements
present some immediate problems in the context of joint accounts
and marriage.
The first requirement, that the funds in question be prop-
erty of the debtor, creates immediate conflict, since it is often dif-
ficult to determine exactly which spousal property is separate
(nonmarital) and which property is marital.22 Under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 54-169(b).23 the statute controlling the right of deposit on
joint accounts, the amount of any member' s or customer' s inter-
est in a joint account or other account held in the names of more
than one person is subject to the right of setoff.24 However, funds
deposited in a joint account by married persons may be held to
have merged interests and thus no longer remain separate prop-
erty.25 Determining the extent of the married customer' s interest
in the account is tricky, since his interest may be indistinguish-
able from that of his spouse.26 Difficulty with the second re-
quirement of deposit without restriction is similar: since the
property in question may be of indeterminate origin, a bank may
or customer to whom or upon whose behalf the savings bank has
made as unsecured advance of money by loan. Upon default in the
repayment or satisfaction thereof, the savings bank may cancel on
its books any or part of the deposit accounts owned by the member
or customer and apply the value of the accounts in payment of the
obligation.
See id. at 54C-169(a). In addition, the statute provides for 30 days' notice to the af-
fected customer that the right to withdraw funds will be exercised and permits the
bank to freeze the account during this 30 day period. See id. at 54C-169(b).
21. See Laurino, supra note 18, at 63. Sepinuck also lists four basic require-
ments for setoff: the provision that the two lists have in common is that of mutual-
ity, and the remaining factors listed by Sepinuck are maturity of debt, non-
contingency of debt, and liquidity of debt. Sepinuck, supra note 15, at 67-68.
22. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54C-169(b)(1999).
25. See Lilly v. Lilly, 107 N.C. App. 484, 486, 420 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1992). The
burden of proof in such a case is placed on the party who claims that the property is
marital in nature. See id. Separate property does not become marital simply be-
cause it was deposited in a joint account. See id.
26. See id.
2000]
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have trouble discovering whether each party placed restrictions
on the account. 27
The most challenging problem is presented by the third
requirement that the indebtedness be due and owing.28 This re-
quirement may be technically met, but, as in the case of Harold
and Wendy, only one spouse may have borrowed the money.
Whether both spouses must pay is not a question that has been
completely answered yet in North Carolina.29 Closely related to
the requirement of existing indebtedness is mutuality, or a recip-
rocal relationship of debt between bank and account holder.30
Whether mutuality is required is a key question, since the addi-
tion of a third party or spouse in a joint account introduces a per-
son who may have no reciprocal relationship with the bank.
The requirement of mutuality is present in North Carolina
case law.31 The presence of mutuality suggests that in a marital
situation, where only one spouse' s debt is owing, the joint ac-
count shared by both spouses is protected.32 However, a modem
commentator has suggested that account contracts and state stat-
utes may overcome the requirement of mutuality. 33 The require-
27. See id.
28. See Laurino, supra note 18, at 63.
29. Whether both spouses must pay via setoff as joint account holders has not
been clearly decided. However, under current North Carolina family law, a debt
incurred by one spouse during the marriage is marital property for which both par-
ties are made responsible through equitable distribution. See Geer v. Geer 84 N.C.
App. 471,475,353 S.E.2d 427,429 (1987).
30. See In re Battery King Mfg. Co., 240 N.C. 586, 589, 83 S.E.2d 490,492 (1954)
(holding that purchaser of accounts receivable was subject to claims filed against
receiver). "Setoff operates by way of payment where there are reciprocal demands.
It may be invoked only where there is mutuality of parties and of demand." Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Laurino, supra note 18, at 64.
At common law, a bank typically had to concede a lack of mutual-
ity when at least one of the holders of the joint account did not have
a debt with the bank.... Today, courts rarely result to common law
to settle a joint account setoff dispute. Instead, courts look to two
other sources: (1) the provision in the account agreement and (2)
the state statutes regulating bank accounts. The problems arise
when, as is too often the case, neither the statute(s) nor the account
contract squarely address the issue, yet the court insists on trying to
extract an answer through a mixture of statutory interpretation or
contract and property law without fully considering all the policy
480 [Vol. 4
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ment of mutuality seems almost insurmountable in any case in-
volving joint accounts, a single borrower, and setoff, since by the
nature of the case, at least one of the parties that the bank is set-
ting off against is not a debtor.34 However, the recent decisions of
at least one state court have chosen to overlook the requirement
in favor of other factors. 35
Ill. THE NORTH CAROLINA MARITAL PROPERTY DISTMBUTMON Acr
Returning to the situation of Harold and Wendy, suppose
that Wendy has filed for divorce. Harold and Wendy would like
to split their property, but Wendy is reluctant to take on Harold's
debt from the failed store. She is incensed when she learns that
bank officials are planning to set off Harold's debt against their
joint account. What will happen when Harold and Wendy divide
their property pursuant to North Carolina law?
The North Carolina Marital Property Distribution Act
(hereafter referred to as the North Carolina Act) allows for the
distribution by the court of marital property upon divorce.36
Early subsections of the North Carolina Act define what property
is marital and what property is separate.37 Marital property is de-
fined as "all real and personal property acquired by either spouse
or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the
date of the separation of the parties, and presently owned." 38
Conversely, separate property consists of all real and personal
property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a
spouse by bequest, devise, descent or gift during the course of
issues involved.
Id. Laurino points out that even when mutuality analysis is bypassed in favor of
contractual analysis, the contract is still construed against the party who prepared it
(here, the bank) and that an account holder against whose account a setoff occurs
can raise the issue of meaningful assent. See Laurino, supra note 18, at 65.
34. See id.
35. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing Pope v. First of
America, 699 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. 1998) and Fisher v. State Bank of Annawan, 643
N.E.2d 811 (Ill. 1994)).
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1999).
37. See id. at § 50-20(b)(1-2).
38. Id. at § 50-20(b)(1).
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the marriage." 39 Two particular aspects of the North Carolina Act
are relevant here.
First, under the North Carolina Act, equal division is gen-
erally presumed.40 Public policy favors equal division, reflecting
the idea that marriage is a partnership enterprise.41 By stating
that "[T]here shall be an equal division by using net value of
marital property... unless the court determines that an equal divi-
sion is not equitable," 42 the statute provides for an equitable divi-
sion in some cases rather than an equal one, using a list of twelve
factors.43
The second relevant aspect of the North Carolina Act is
the presumption that property is marital.44 The North Carolina
39. Id. at § 50-20(b)(2).
40. See White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776,324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985).
41. See The Partnership Ideal, supra note 4, at 197-198.
In particular, the partnership concept of marriage embodied in the
statute has extended long-overdue recognition to the invaluable
contributions of homemaker spouses and has helped to restore con-
siderable balance to the process of private bargaining. Most signifi-
cantly, the partnership concept has been instrumental in guiding
courts to a restrained interpretation of the broad separate property
provision of the statute.
Id
42. N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-20(c) (1999). For a concise discussion of the distinc-
tion between equal and equitable division, see The Partnership Ideal, supra note 4, at
244-247 (1987). See also Willis v. Willis, 86 N.C. App. 546, 549, 358 S.E.2d 571, 573
(1987) (holding that "marital property is to be distributed equally, unless the court
determines that equal is not equitable.").
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1-12) (1999).
Factors used by the court include:
[tihe income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the
division of property is to become effective, support obligations, the
duration of the marriage, the need of the custodial parent to use the
family residence and its belongings, the expectation of 'deferred
compensation rights,' equitable claim to marital property by party
not on title, contribution to career of other spouse, 'direct contribu-
tion to increase in value of separate property which occurs during
the course of the marriage,' liquidity of marital property, tax conse-
quences, 'the acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or
expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue, or convert such marital prop-
erty, during the period after separation of the parties and before the
time of distribution,' and other factors found by the court to be 'just
and proper'.
Id.
44. See id. "Under our equitable distribution statute, only assets and debts are
subject to classification as marital property." Adams v. Adams, 115 N.C. App. 168,
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Act "creates a presumption that all property acquired by the par-
ties during the course of the marriage is marital property," and
this presumption may be rebutted by "clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence that the property comes within the separate prop-
erty division."45 By extension, therefore, the debt acquired by the
parties is presumed marital unless proven otherwise.46 Pursuant
to this notion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
both parties to a marriage are liable for marital debt, with a sub-
sequent case limiting marital debt to that incurred before the
separation of the parties.47 The court stated that all debt of parties
should be considered during division of assets.48 Marital debt is
thus included in the three-step process set up by the court to de-
170, 443 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1994). See also Huguelet v. Huguelet, 113 N.C. App. 533,
536, 439 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1994).
45. Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 209-210, 324 S.E.2d 33, 37, cert. denied 313
N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985) (citing Mims v. Mines, 305 N.C. 41, 57-58, 286 S.E.2d
779, 790 (1982)) (construed gift to wife from mother as gift to couple because wife
did not present evidence to rebut presumption of marital property). But see John-
son v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 454, 346 S.E.2d 430, 440 (1986) (held in footnote that
presumption of marital property was not created by statute.) "Under our statutory
scheme, without the aid of any presumption, assets, the classification of which is
disputed, must simply be labeled for equitable distribution purposes either as...
marital... or ... separate depending upon the proof presented to the trial court of
the nature of those assets." Id.
46. See Loeb, 72 N.C.App. at 210, 324 S.E.2d at 37 (announced rebuttable pre-
sumption of marital property); Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471,475,353 S.E.2d 427,
429 (1987) (held that debt is divisible marital property). See also Wornom v. Wor-
nom, 126 N.C. App. 461, 466, 485 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1997) (holding that debt distrib-
uted as marital property is subject to a finding of fault or waste).
47. See Geer, 84 N.C. App. at 474,353 S.E.2d at 428:
We hold that G.S. 50-20(c)(1) requires the court to consider all debts
of the parties, whether a debt is one for which the parties are le-
gally, jointly liable, or one for which only one party is legally, indi-
vidually liable. Regardless of who is legally obligated for the debt,
for the purpose of an equal distribution, a marital debt is defined as
a debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the par-
ties.
Id. Cf Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 334 S.E.2d 256 (1985) (holding that a sav-
ings account could be considered marital property). In Talent, one of the marital
properties in question was a savings account worth approximately $68,000, and the
court held that "since the $68,000 was acquired by the parties during their marriage
and was owned by them on the date of their separation, under the circumstances of
this case, the court correctly determined that the full $68,000 should be considered
marital property as defined in G.S. 50-20(b)(1)." Talent, 76 N.C. App. At 553, 334
S.E.2d at 262.
48. See id.
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termine the distribution of property.49
Under this analysis, set forth in Willis v. Willis, the court
must first determine what is marital property, then evaluate the
net market value of the marital property at the date of separation,
and finally, make an equitable distribution of the marital prop-
erty.50 In the case of Harold and Wendy, the presumptions of
equal division and marital property mean that: (1) unless an
equal division is not equitable, their property is to be equally di-
vided; 51 (2) this division would include the debt of Harold in-
curred before the end of the marriage; 2 (3) Wendy would thus be
liable for Harold' s debt in some fashion; 3 and (4) even if their
joint account was not accessible through setoff before divorce,
Wendy might be deemed a debtor through the process of equita-
ble distribution, thus providing the missing requirement of mu-
tuality needed for setoff.54
Three recent North Carolina cases have reaffirmed the
state' s position on division of marital properties.5 5 Wornom v.
Wornom, a 1997 case, deals with equitable distribution of the debt
from a bank loan among spouses.56 Riggs v. Riggs, a 1996 case,
49. See Mrozek v. Mrozek, 129 N.C. App. 43, 46, 496 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1998)
(citing Miller v. Miller, 97 N.C. App. 77, 79,387 S.E.2d 181,183 (1990)). "In an equi-
table distribution action, the trial court is required to classify, value, and distribute,
if marital, the debts of the parties to the marriage." Id.
50. See Willis v. Willis, 86 N.C. App. 546,550,358 S.E.2d 571,573 (1987) (citing
Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12,18,327 S.E.2d 283,286 (1985)).
51. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (describing equitable and
equal distribution).
52. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (describing the inclusion of
debt as a marital asset).
53. See id.
54. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (describing mutuality as a re-
quirement for setoff).
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. Wornom v. Wornom, 126 N.C.App. 461, 485 S.E.2d 856 (1997) (holding
that fault could be considered when former husband and wife took out large loans
from banks and relatives to support business, but business failed because of wife' s
neglect and theft). In Wornom, the court held that" marital fault or misconduct of
the parties which is not related to the economic condition of the marriage is not
germane to a division of marital property and should not be considered. However,
fault, which is related to the economic condition of the marriage may be considered.
Fault or misconduct which dissipates or reduces marital property for nonmarital
purposes is just and proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(12)." Id. at 126 N.C.
App. 461, 466, 485 S.E.2d 856, 859 (citing Spence v. Jones, 83 N.C. App. 8,11, 348
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deals with the classification of a certificate of deposit.5 7 Lilly v.
Lilly, a 1992 case, covers insurance settlements for one spouse
deposited into a joint checking account.58 All three cases use the
rules created by the state appellate courts in the 1980s to classify
and distribute marital assets.59
IV. NORTH CAROLINA LAW VS. THE LAW OF OTHER STATES
In a situation like that of Harold and Wendy, where the
bank would like to set off the debt of a former spouse against a
joint account, North Carolina law differs from that of other states
in two main regards. First, rather than emphasizing the problem-
atic requirements of mutuality or making a choice between case
S.E.2d 819, 821 (quoting Smith v. Smith 314 N.C. 80, 87-88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687
(1985)). Under this rule, hypothetical husband Harold might have a problem in
equitable distribution: if he wasted the money loaned to him by the bank, and the
bank chose to exercise the right of setoff against Harold and Wendy=s joint
account, Harold may have fault allocated to him in the division of property pro-
ceedings. See id.
57. Riggs v. Riggs, 124 N.C. App. 647, 478 S.E.2d 211 (1996) (holding that
plaintiff had failed to meet burden in showing that a portion of CD funds was sepa-
rate). The plaintiff contended that $9,677.67 of the funds of a CD valued at ap-
proximately $40,000 was separate, and produced a withdrawal slip to verify his
assertion, but the court found that the property was marital. See Riggs, 124 N.C.
App. at 648,478 S.E.2d at 213-214.
58. Lilly v. Lilly, 107 N.C. App. 484, 420 S.E.2d 492 (1992) (holding that an in-
surance settlement to a wife was not marital property even after deposit into joint
account). In Lilly, the court stated that "the party claiming that property is marital
has the burden of proving beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the prop-
erty was acquired by either spouse or both spouses, was acquired during the course
of the marriage, was acquired before the date of separation of the parties, and is
presently owned." Lilly, 107 N.C. App. at 485-486,420 S.E.2d at 492-493. If a party is
able to meet this burden, then the burden shifts to the party claiming that the prop-
erty is separate "to show by a preponderance of evidence that the property meets
the definition of separate property." Id. If in our hypothetical Harold claims that the
debt is marital and can thus be satisfied by use of other marital funds and appor-
tioned to each party, he has the burden of proving these elements. See id. If Harold
meets his burden of proof, then the burden shifts to Wendy to prove that the prop-
erty was separate in nature. See Caudill v. Caudill, 131 N.C. App. 854, 857, 509
S.E.2d 246, 248-249 (1998). But see McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 147-148,
327 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1985) (stating that "[plroperty acquired in exchange for sepa-
rate property is separate property, as is income derived from separate property and
increases in value of separate property"); Manes v. Harrison-Manes, 79 N.C. App.
170, 172, 338 S.E.2d 815, 817 (1986) (holding that "the deposit of [separate] funds
into a joint account, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to show a gift or an
intent to convert the funds from separate property to marital property").
59. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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law approaches to the ownership of funds, some states prefer to
focus on the contractual agreement between the parties.60 Under
such an approach, North Carolina might focus on the contract
between Harold and Wendy and the bank as regards the right of
setoff and their joint account. 61 Second, other states simply take
the approach opposite that of North Carolina cases defining the
ownership and disposition of marital funds.62
Illinois courts have recently decided the question of setoff
against joint accounts in a way different from the approach in
North Carolina.63 Rather than emphasizing the setoff inquiry as
part of an equitable remedy for the bank, the Illinois Supreme
Court chose to examine the basis of the contract between the de-
positor and the bank and grounded the right of setoff in that con-
tract.64 In doing so, the Court looked past the traditional notion of
mutuality.65 Since the account contract in Fisher specifically stated
that the bank could treat each depositor in the account as an ab-
solute owner, the requirement of mutuality of obligation for set-
off was unnecessary under the terms of the contract.66 An Illinois
60. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing sample joint account
contracts under North Carolina statute).
62. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text (dealing with setoff law in
North Carolina).
64. See Fisher v. State Bank of Annawan, 643 N.E.2d 811, 813-4 (I1. 1994)
(allowing setoff by defendant bank of son's debt against certificate of deposit jointly
held by parent and child). The court was careful to distinguish joint bank accounts
from joint tenancies in real property; therefore, the rule of setoff in this opinion is
confined to the bank-depositor context. See id.
65. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
66. See Fisher, 643 N.E.2d at 812. The specific text upon which the court based
its conclusion is as follows:
If more than one depositor is named above, and unless specifically
indicated therein to the contrary, this certificate and the deposit
evidenced hereby, shall belong to said depositors as joint tenants
with right of survivorship (and not as tenants in common); pro-
vided, however, for all purposes, including endorsement, payment
of principal and interest, presentation, transfer, and any notice to or
from the depositors, this institution may deem and treat as the ab-
solute owner hereof any one depositor named above, or the survi-
vor or survivors, and each such depositor shall be the agent of each
other depositor for all the foregoing purposes.
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appellate court followed this opinion in Pope v. First of America.67
In contrast to the approach taken by Illinois courts, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has focused on mutuality of obliga-
tion rather than the terms of the contract.68 The contract at issue
in Wallace v. United Mississippi Bank made mention of an interest
roughly equivalent to the right of setoff against either party for
the debts of one.69 The court in that case focused on the require-
ment of mutuality of demand, meaning that debts were between
the same parties in the same capacity. 70 The Wallace court held
that even though the debtor's interest in the joint account was
equal to the balance in the account as stipulated by agreement,
the requirement of mutuality still controlled.71 This approach is
more like the one taken by North Carolina courts in older cases.72
The North Carolina contract comparable to the contracts
in Fisher,73 Pope,74 and Wallace75 can be found at N.C. Gen. Stat. §
It is interesting to compare and contrast this contract with those provided by
some banks with branches in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. See BB&T, BANK SERVICES
AGREEMENT 2 (1999) (pamphlet distributed to each customer who opens an account)
[BB&T]. This BB&T document contains the following language that directly pro-
vides the bank a right of setoff:
Each joint owner also authorizes the bank to exercise setoff and en-
force its security interest in the entire joint account even though
only one of the joint owners is the debtor. These rights exist irre-
spective of who contributes funds to the joint account. The Bank is
not bound by the knowledge of and has no duty to inquire as to the
source of funds deposited in the joint account and each joint owner
shall have an equal and undivided interest in the entire account.
Id.
It is instructive to compare this provision to the standard language of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 53-146.1, which is used in other contracts. See BANK OF AMERICA, PER-
SONAL SIGNATURE CARD WITH SuBSTUTE FORM W-9 (1999); FIRST UNION, DEPOSIT
ACCOUNT APPLICATION (1999). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra
note 77 and accompanying text (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146.1).
67. See Pope v. First of Am., 699 N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ill. App. 1998) (allowing
bank to assert setoff as affirmative defense when mother sued over denial of with-
drawal right because of minor son's conversion of funds from an unrelated ac-
count).
68. See Wallace v. United Mississippi Bank, 726 So.2d 578,583-584 (Miss. 1998)
(holding that bank wrongfully set off loans to deceased husband alone against joint
account held by husband and wife).
69. See id.
70. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
71. See Wallace, 726 So.2d at 582-3.
72. See supra notes 16 and 30-31 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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53-146.1.76 As is shown in the minimum contract provided, no
express provision giving the bank the right of setoff is made in
the contract between North Carolina banks and their account
holders. 7 Thus, the Illinois approach would be difficult to apply
under the current North Carolina laws.78 In addition to lacking
an express right to setoff in the sample contract, the right of com-
plete setoff in joint accounts is not granted in the North Carolina
statute governing the right of setoff on deposit accounts.79 N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 54C-169 limits the amount that can be set off in such
an account to "the amount of any member's or customer's inter-
est" in the account
Determining the amount of a married customer's interest
in a joint account is problematic, considering the differing pre-
sumptions relating to how and whether funds placed in a joint
account become marital property.80 In the case of an account
whose holders are attempting to obtain a divorce, the bank is
aided by the court's determination of which property is marital
and which property is separate.81 Here, the approach which the
state takes to determine division of marital funds becomes key.
In Harold and Wendy' s case, the court' s decision that
Harold and Wendy both owed the debt was relatively easy, since
the debt was incurred during marriage and was thus presumed
75. See supra at notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
76. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146.1 (1999).
77. See id. The sample contract simply says:
We understand that by establishing a joint account under the pro-
visions of North Carolina General Statute 53-146.1 that: the bank (or
name of institution) may pay the money in the account to, or on the
order of, any person named in the account unless we have agreed
with the bank that withdrawals require more than one signature.
Id. In addition, the contract includes a clause creating a right of survivorship. See id.
Generally, statutes not addressing ownership or setoff are not likely to be found
sufficient to impute a statutory setoff right. Laurino, supra note 18, at 72. However,
banks may place their own language in the contract. See supra notes 64-67 and
accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (explaining how banks may
place their own provisions in contracts with customers).
79. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54C-169(b) (1999).
80. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina
presumptions). See infra notes 87-97 (discussing presumptions of other states).
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1-2) (1999).
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marital.82 However, had the presumption that the debt was mari-
tal not been invoked, the court might have had to rely on a dif-
ferent approach to divide the debt. In North Carolina, the courts
use the source of funds approach, first described in the bell-
wether case of Wade v. Wade.83 Briefly, the source of funds rule
recognizes the dual nature of property acquired with both mari-
tal and separate assets through creating a third characterization
of property: part separate and part marital.84 The North Carolina
approach differs markedly from some other states' rules.85
In particular, Tennessee is among the states whose courts
have adopted the doctrines of transmutation and commingling.86
The court in Wade discussed these two ideas as one theory-
"transmutation through commingling." 87 Under this theory, "af-
firmative acts of augmenting separate property by commingling
it with marital resources [are] viewed as indicative of an intent to
transmute, or transform, the separate property to marital prop-
erty."88 The defendant in Wade proposed that these rules be
adopted; however, the court refused to do so, implying that such
a theory rested on assumptions not made by the North Carolina
legislature. 89
82. See Lilly v. Lilly, 107 N.C. App. 484,485-486,420 S.E.2d 492,492-493 (1992).
83. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372,325 S.E.2d 260, review denied 313 N.C.
612,330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
84. See Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269. "Under this theory, when
both the marital and separate estates contribute assets toward the acquisition of
property, each estate is entitled to an interest in the property in the ratio its contri-
bution bears to the total investment in the property. Thus, both the separate and
marital estates receive a proportionate and fair return on its [sic] investment." Id.
85. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text (discussing transmutation
through commingling and contrasting doctrine with source of funds approach used
in North Carolina).
87. Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269.
88. Id.
89. See id.
Adoption of the theory of transmutation has been based on the pre-
conceived legislative preference for the classification of property as
marital. North Carolina has not legislatively adopted a presump-
tion that the property acquired during the marriage is marital, as
has Illinois, and in fact has adopted a more expansive definition of
separate property than most states...we conclude that in order to be
consistent with the language and purpose of G.S. 50-20 the real
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The definitions of marital and separate property used by
the Tennessee courts are substantially similar to those used in the
North Carolina Act.90 In a recent case, Sickler v. Sickler,91 one party
opened various bank accounts in his name only and expected to
maintain full control of those accounts after his divorce.92 How-
ever, the Tennessee appellate court upheld the lower court's rul-
ing that "all assets claimed by either party to be marital property
were marital assets subject to equitable division."93 The court in
Sickler expressly chose to recognize the doctrines of transmuta-
tion and commingling, stating that after property has been de-
termined to be separate pursuant to the relevant statute, "the
court must decide whether that property became part of the
marital estate because the parties treated it in such a manner."94
The court defined transmutation as a transformation of
separate property to marital property occurring when "separate
property is treated in such a way as to give evidence of an inten-
tion that it become marital property."95 Endorsing the doctrine of
commingling, the court held that separate property becomes
marital property when it is "inextricably mingled with marital
property or with the separate property of the other spouse."96
property concerned herein must be characterized as part separate
and part marital.
Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently rejected the theory again in a 1998
case. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. 411,418,508 S.E.2d 300, 305 (1998).
90. See TENN. CODE ANN. 36-4-121 (b)(1)-(2) (1999); cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b) (1999). Marital property is defined in Tennessee as: "[A]II real and personal
property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during
the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by
either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce. "Id. Sepa-
rate property includes the following:
[A11I real and personal property owned by a spouse before mar-
riage; property acquired in exchange for property acquired before
the marriage; income from and appreciation of property owned by
a spouse before marriage except when characterized as marital
property; and property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent.
Id.
91. See Sickler v. Sickler, No. 01-A-01-9710-CV00571, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS
286, at *2 (May 5,1999).
92. See id. at 2.
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id. at *8.
95. Id. at *8.
96. Id. at *9. In the states of Mississippi and Arkansas, simply placing the
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The Tennessee approach clearly has different consequences from
the source of funds rule adopted in North Carolina.
For example, suppose that Harold and Wendy live in a ju-
risdiction in which the laws are similar to those of Tennessee. As-
sume that Harold treated the loan funds from First Local in such
a way as to evince intent that they be marital property. In Ten-
nessee, the funds have effectively become marital property and
are part of an ownership interest that cannot be separated on a
pro rata basis by tracing the source of the funds.97 In addition, if
the funds have been commingled with marital funds, whether by
deposit in the marital joint account or by other method, they also
become part of an ownership interest that cannot be easily sorted
out by a bank wishing to set off individual debt.98 A bank choos-
ing to exercise the right of setoff in this context would probably
be more likely to setoff against the account as a whole, since the
pro rata interests in the account are not as determinable as those
under the North Carolina account governed by the source-of-
funds approach.99
Thus, the Tennessee laws may not provide a measure of
protection to the non-borrower spouse that the North Carolina
laws may: since Tennessee courts consider funds to be marital if
at all mingled in any way, both spouses must pay the debt of ei-
ther if the property is deemed marital.100 The opposite result
would be true in North Carolina: property possibly of a dual
character (the third characterization under the rule in Wade)
would more likely be protected, and thus payout would occur
under a pro rata scheme as suggested by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 54C-
169(b).101
Haneline v. Haneline, a Nebraska case, makes an interest-
other spouse's name on the account can destroy the identity of the funds therein as
separate, nonmarital property. See Myrick v. Myrick, 739 So.2d 432,433 (Miss. App.
1999); McKay v. McKay, 989 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Ark. App. 1999). In Arkansas, a pre-
sumption of marital property ensues which can only be overcome by clear and con-
vincing evidence. See McKay, 989 S.W.2d at 562.
97. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
98. See id.
99. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372,325 S.E.2d 260, review denied 313 N.C.
612,330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
100. See Sickler, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286, *9-10.
101. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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ing point regarding administrative feasibility, stating that "trac-
ing the money [in the case in question, premarital property de-
posited into a joint account] is not feasible." 0 2 Although the
Tennessee approach may be less beneficial in some regards for
bank customers, it can boast of the benefit of simplicity.10 3 Trac-
ing account funds under the North Carolina approach could eas-
ily become quite difficult depending on the amount of money
involved and financial sophistication of the spouses.' 4 Such a
situation would be particularly frustrating for a bank which
wants to exercise the right of setoff because of its swiftness and
simplicity as a remedy.10 5
V. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY LEGAL SCHOLARS: How WOULD THEY
WORK IN NORTH CAROLINA?
Two researchers who have examined the subject of setoff
in joint accounts at length have come up with varying strategies
to reduce the harm to bank customers and make the bank's right
of setoff more efficient.0 6 One commentator has suggested
amending the signature form provided by banks upon the open-
ing of a joint account to include a provision that would expressly
give the right of setoff to banks.10 7 Banks would be expected to
provide information to prospective customers about the different
types of joint accounts. 08 In exchange for this information pro-
vided by banks, a customer's signature on one account contract
102. Haneline v. Haneline, No. A-97-1293, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS 101, "13
(March 30,1999).
103. Sickler, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286, *9-10.
104. See The Partnership Ideal, supra note 4, at 220. Application of the source of
funds doctrine depends on the ability to trace the contribution of property from
either a marital or separate source to an asset with a contrary classification. This
will sometimes involve an attempt to trace out marital property contributions from
separate property. Id. In addition, Sharp states that "the demands of tracing can
vary enormously, depending largely on the nature of the contributed asset and the
amount of time that has passed since the contribution." Id.
105. See Sepinuck, supra note 15, at 65 (describing setoff as attractive remedy for
banks because of relative quickness).
106. See Laurino, supra note 18; Sepinuck, supra note 15.
107. See Laurino, supra note 18, at 79.
108. See id.
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would be deemed sufficient for other identical accounts that
might be created by the customer. 0 9
This approach would retain the net contribution/pro rata
rule, similar to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 54C-169(b), allowing banks to
exercise the setoff right over "a debtor's net contribution to the
account, or in absence of evidence thereof, the debtor's pro rata
share of the account."" 0 The approach then sets forth five essen-
tial statutory provisions, dealing with presumption of joint ten-
ancy in cases of accounts under two or more names, ownership
of deposited funds in proportion to contributions by each party,
no requirement of inquiry into source of funds when determining
said contribution, setoff of deposits subject to ownership designa-
tion, and validity of pledges of multi-party accounts."' Under
this approach, North Carolina law would resemble that found in
Fisher: courts would emphasize the contract signed between bank
and customer rather than common law requirements of mutual-
ity.112
109. See id.
110. Id. at 81.
111. See id. at 82-3. The provisions are as follows:
1. A deposit account opened or certificate of deposit purchased in
the name of two or more depositors should be presumed to be an
account or certificate held in joint tenancy with the right of survi-
vorship, unless the parties agree otherwise.
2. Funds deposited into a multiple party account belong to each
depositor in proportion to that party's net contribution.
3. A financial institution is not required to enquire into, for the
purposes of establishing net contribution, either the source of the
funds received or the proposed application of the funds with-
drawn.
4. Deposits in multiple-party accounts shall be subject to setoff for
obligations to the financial institution by persons designated in the
account contract as owners of the funds to the extent of ownership
at the date of setoff.
5. The pledge to any association of all or part of a multiple party ac-
count signed by any one of the tenants upon whose signature
withdrawals may be made from the account, shall, unless the terms
of the account provided specifically to the contrary, be a valid
pledge and transfer to the association of that part or the account
pledged and shall not operate to sever or terminate all or any part
of the account.
Id.
112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to these provisions, which are specific to setoff
and joint accounts, the Uniform Setoff Act proposed in another
approach is more of an omnibus provision." 3 The most relevant
provision for the purpose of this analysis is the one requiring mu-
tuality of debt unless otherwise agreed." 4 Adding this provision
would result in a resemblance to Wallace: the requirement of mu-
tuality of debt would trump contractual provisions." 5
All of these suggestions are useful and intelligently rea-
soned. However, a simple provision could be enacted in order to
remedy the special difficulty attached to joint accounts and setoff
in North Carolina. Two choices immediately present themselves
for consideration. First, an addition to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1's
model contract" 6 between banks and depositors could solve the
problems in both the general context of joint accounts and the
specific context of marital accounts. Ideally, the addition would
explicitly authorize setoff by banks on customers' joint accounts,
which would allow North Carolina courts to take the Illinois ap-
proach in emphasizing the terms of the contract between cus-
tomer and bank.117 Such an addition might mirror the language
used by BB&T in its Bank Services Agreement:
Each joint owner also authorizes the bank to exercise set-
off and enforce its security interest in the entire joint account
even though only one of the joint owners is the debtor. These
rights exist irrespective of who contributes funds to the joint ac-
count. The bank is not bound by the knowledge of and has no
duty to inquire as to the source of funds deposited into the joint
account and each joint owner shall have an equal and undivided
interest n the entire account."8
113. See Sepinuck, supra note 15, at 101.
114. See id. at 101. The relevant provision states that the right to setoff would
exist under two conditions. See id. First, "[u]nless otherwise agreed, a creditor may
set off only mutual debts." Id. Second, "[d]ebts are mutual if every creditor owed is
a primary obligor on the other debt or has consented to the exercise of setoff." Id.
115. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146.1 (1999).
117. See Fisher v. the State Bank of Annawan, 643 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. 1994) (al-
lowing setoff by defendant bank of son's debt against certificate of deposit jointly
held by parent and child).
118. See BB&T, supra note 66, at 2.
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An amendment to the sample contract could give all
banks the right to setoff against the full account for the debt of
one holder. This choice would give banks a right of setoff similar
to that in Fisher'19 and Pope.120
Should that choice prove unacceptable, the second option
is to expressly provide a contractual reference to the rule in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 54C-169.121 Such a reference would state that the
debtor holder's pro rata interest or share is subject to the right of
setoff. 2 This second option seems more suitable in the marital
context, since it fits well within the context of the source of funds
rule.123 However, the former option has its attractions as well. If
duly included in the contract, it would give the parties more in-
dividual notice that they were liable for the consequences of acts
of each party that might affect the status of the joint account. 2 4
Either choice would be a better solution than to have no
particular rule expressly stated. Whether North Carolina chooses
to resemble Illinois in emphasis on contract or Mississippi in em-
phasis on mutuality, it needs to create a clear path for banks and
119. See Fisher, 643 N.E.2d at 812:
If more than one depositor is named above, and unless specifically
indicated therein to the contrary, this certificate and the deposit
evidenced hereby, shall belong to said depositors as joint tenants
with right of survivorship (and not as tenants in common): pro-
vided, however, for all purposes, including endorsement, payment
of principal or interest, presentation, transfer, and any notice to or
from the depositors, this institution may deem and treat as the ab-
solute owner hereof any one depositor named above, or the survi-
vor or survivors, and each such depositor shall be the agent of each
other depositor for all the foregoing purposes.
Id.
120. See Pope v. First of Am., 699 N.E.2d 178 (11. App. 1998).
121. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
122. See id.
123. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
124. See BB&T, supra note 66, at 2.
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customers to follow.125 As long as the legislature does not pro-
vide clear legal guidelines on the questions attendant to setoff
and joint accounts, the rules surrounding them will remain a
patchwork of supposition and reliance on dated case law.
NANcY RAY
125. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
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